A abordagem contratualista de "a theory of justice" entre método e objetivos. Algumas observações a partir das últimas críticas de Onora O'Neill

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose, through the role that the relationship between method and objectives plays in "A theory of justice", a possible reading of the contractarian sui generis approach adopted by Rawls in his masterpiece. In particular, we will take advantage, as a starting point, of two critical objections that Onora O'Neill presents in one of her latest interventions on Rawls' thought. Then, we will try to show how such critical objections are somewhat insubstantial, to the extent that the complementarity between some methodological aspects and the general objectives assumed in "A theory of justice" is emphasized, especially with regard to the characterization of the original position as ideal situation of deliberation among rational agents who recognize themselves as free and equal in their plurality. In this sense, we will focus on the interpretation of the link between the veil of ignorance and the reflective equilibrium as a constitutive moment of a process of practical reflection in which logical-formal rationality and reasonableness of restrictions interact, without contradiction. Hence, we will indicate, in a general and absolutely provisional way, in which terms it seems possible to reconcile constructivism and contractualism in "A theory of justice".