Use este identificador para citar ou linkar para este item: http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/46396
Título: The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
Título(s) alternativo(s): A objeção de má companhia e a extensionalidade da lógica da Frege
Palavras-chave: Abstraction principles
Content recarving
Bad company objection
Frege’s logic
Princípios de Abstração
Má companhia
Reentalhamento do conteúdo
Lógica de Frege
Data do documento: 2020
Editor: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
Citação: CICCARELLI, V. The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic. Perspectiva Filosófica, Recife, v. 47, n. 2, p. 231-247, 2020.
Resumo: According to the Bad Company objection, the fact that Frege’s infamous Basic Law V instantiates the general definitional pattern of higher-order abstraction principles is a good reason to doubt the soundness of this sort of definitions. In this paper I argue against this objection by showing that the definitional pattern of abstraction principles – as extrapolated from §64 of Frege’s Grundlagen– includes an additional requirement (which I call the specificity condition) that is not satisfied by the Basic Law V while is satisfied by other higher-order abstractions such as Hume’s Principle. I also show that the failure of this additional requirement in the case of Basic Law V is engendered by an essential feature of Frege’s conception of logic and thus that Frege himself should not have regarded the Basic Law V as a definition by abstraction.
URI: http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/46396
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