Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/59103
Title: O problema da distinguibilidade do objeto: uma análise da proposição de número 2.0233 do Tractatus
Other Titles: The problem of object distinguishability: an analysis of proposition number 2.0233 of the Tractatus
Authors: Silveira, Léa Carneiro
Nakano, Anderson L.
Cuter, João Vergílio Gallerani
Cunha, João Geraldo Martins da
Silveira, Léa Carneiro
Keywords: Lógica
Tractatus
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus
Logic
Issue Date: 17-Apr-2024
Publisher: Universidade Federal de Lavras
Citation: SOUZA, A. L. de. O problema da distinguibilidade do objeto: uma análise da proposição de número 2.0233 do Tractatus. 2024. 89 p. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia)–Universidade Federal de Lavras, Lavras, 2024.
Abstract: Wittgenstein offers us in proposition 2.0233 of the Tractatus a kind of enigma. Talking about objects of the same logical type has to do with what? With logic or with the application of logic? In 5.557 we learn that the application of logic decides which elementary propositions exist. Which may mean that we will only find out how many types simple objects are, for example, later, with the application of logic. What is the function of 2.0233? How would the aphorism recorded in it relate to the other propositions in harmony? Wouldn't the definition of a logically simple object of this type imply the possibility of another of the same type, if one exists? Indiscernibility in this case would have a unitary character, and this incommonality between equal objects, according to their shape, would be because they “differ from one another just by being different”. How to measure the degree of “apodicticity” of proposition number 2.0233 within the Tractatus, which has 2.02331 as its appendix? This involves analyzing whether the idea of “simple objects of the same indifferentiable logical type” holds up: either because it is a notion deducible from the rest of the work, and, therefore, something that logic can anticipate, or because it is something that appears, later, with the “application of logic” (5.557). Wouldn't the assumption of the existence of objects of the same logical type weaken the concept of “object”, which is defined as an irreducible and simple thing? Is saying how many there are something different from saying how many types there are? Or is saying how many types there are the same as saying how many there are? Now, we are talking about the very substance of the world. If we have 2.0233 in mind, 5.557 seems to allow us to think about something of an essential nature “after” logic, with its application. This work aims to create some interpretations on this topic and measure the internal coherence of the Tractatus, which was intended to be irreproachable at the time it was written.
URI: http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/59103
Appears in Collections:Filosofia - Mestrado (Dissertações)



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