Má-fé e inconsciente: sobre a crítica de Sartre a Freud em "o ser e o nada"

Abstract

This paper aims to criticize the critique Sartre addresses Freud regarding his introduction to the problem of bad faith in Being and Nothingness. In order to do so, it is divided in fivesteps: 1- to show, albeit very briefly, how bad faith is to be placed as a question in the essay on phenomenological ontology; 2- to follow the features that the philosopher attributes to bad faith in a relation to the act of lying at the beginning of Chapter 2 of the first part of the book; 3- to trail the steps by which Sartre, in the same place of the book, builds his criticism of Freud; 4- to vindicate that such criticisms stem from a misreading of Freudian theory, especially with regard to the issues of re-sistance, of the concepts of Ego and censorship and of the understanding of the unconscious processes as a natural thing; 5- indicates, at the end, as the tension between being and appearance may suggest, after certain mediations, a certain reading of the epistemological nature of metapsychology.