Hegel's a priori and the critique of three aprioristic readings of the science of logic

Abstract

The goal of my essay is to clarify the status of the a priori in Hegel's Science of Logic. My claim is that in order to make possible an appreciation of the originality of Hegel's position we need to map a context of discussion and to dissolve a set of preconceptions about Hegel's idea of philosophy. My argument will be articulated in two parts. In the first part, I will analyse four possible positions regarding the issue of the aprioricity of the Logic, I will defend a fifth position, and I will draw a distinction between apriorism and a priori. In the second part, I will examine three distinct charges of apriorism against Hegel's Logic: the charge of assuming God's point of view of the universe, the charge of vicious circularity between the beginning and the end of the Logic, the charge of self-sufficiency of the Logic. As a result, I hope to show that these charges are unfounded, and to clear the ground for an adequate evaluation of Hegel's own sublation (Aufhebung) of the a priori/a posteriori divide.