Composição e moralidade do melhor dos mundos em Leibniz

Abstract

This paper aims at presenting one aspect of the process of Leibniz to construct his thesis of the best of all possible worlds made by God. In his youth, the philosopher considered that the elaboration of the divine work happens by the combination of elementary parts, namely the requisites. However, that simple model of architecture puts Leibniz dangerously close to the Spinozism, in a way that God could be exclusively the source and the local where would happen the combination of the requisites. Then God could be, for example, the cause of the evil. To avoid that theological problem, Leibniz was motivated to elaborate a more sophisticated ontology focused on the notion of individual substances. Those beings have a certain degree of ontological independence, even if they need God to become real. The new conception of beings allowed not only the distinction between the God’s and the creature’s actions but also performed a change in the Leibnizinian conception about the latest units of the God’s work and the way of the combination of the parts of the world chosen by its creator.