A passagem do "eu penso" ao "eu existo" em Jaakko Hintikka e em Jacques Lacan

Abstract

The passage from "I think" to "I exist" in Jaakko Hintikka and in Jacques Lacan. Although Lacan validates the cogito in the act of enunciation, the interest that he deposits in it is far from the existential auto-verifiability of the proposition "I exist" as sustained by Jaako Hintikka. Even if both of them assume the need of referring the act of representation to something beyond the level of representation (the performative qualification of the cogito), while the philosopher concentrates the power of the Cartesian argument om the proposition "I exist" - for we would know to whom this "I" would be refered to -, to the psychoanalyst this is exactly the proposition which is threatened by invalidation and, such knowledge, the one that must be questioned.