Notas sobre intuição, conceito e reflexão: Fichte e a anfibolia da primeira crítica

Abstract

This paper aims to show that Fichte’s first philosophy is rooted in one of the most central theses of Kantian philosophy: the assumption that human understanding is primarily a synthetic capacity. Therefore, it analyzes the Amphiboly of the first Critique aiming to show that if Fichte is open to be criticized by Kant, and indeed he is, this cannot be summarily understood as an accusation that the Doctrine-of-science would result in a kind of return to Leibniz’s pre-critical rationalism. It seems that certain ambiguities inherent to the formulations of the first Critique would open space, in the post-Kantian scenario and against Schulze’s skepticism, for Fichte’s intention of rewriting the Critique departing from a possible common root between sensitivity and understanding. Accordingly, the deduction of the categories, at least in Longuenesse’s formulation, would already contain certain clues that, ultimately, led Fichte to assume a radical idealism.