A crítica da razão pura e o projeto da metafísica como ciência

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate and clarify the argumentation by which Kant proposes an approach to metaphysics that can be considered as science. To do this, we seek to rely on an interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason that emphasizes the role of metaphysics in his project, as opposed to a reading that highlights the role of the work as a foundation for scientific knowledge. Within this approach, we aim to identify three criteria that Kant defines as indispensable for metaphysics to be recognized as science. We demonstrate how the philosopher addresses each of these criteria, simultaneously conducting a critique of rationalist metaphysics. The first criterion concerns the necessity for metaphysics, as a science, to define the specificity of its knowledge, which Kant identifies as pure knowledge. We highlight Kant's critique of the lack of definition of metaphysical knowledge by the rationalists, as well as the need for separation between pure knowledge and sensible knowledge. The second criterion establishes that a science needs to constitute a synthetic a priori knowledge. When addressing this criterion, Kant makes several criticisms of rationalist metaphysics and the blind confidence it maintained in the principle of non-contradiction as a criterion for grounding the real possibility of a concept or judgment. We also discuss the role of mathematics as a model science and how Kant seeks to distinguish his type of knowledge from metaphysical knowledge. The third criterion establishes that metaphysics needs to be a system. Thus, we highlight the role of the “Architectonic”, a chapter where Kant presents his conception of system. We explore how metaphysics needs a unifying concept that provides unity to its body of knowledge and demonstrates its direction towards practical philosophy. Metaphysics is seen as a system of all systems that guides other sciences with a practical purpose. Finally, we compare the system of metaphysics designed by Kant with the Critique of Pure Reason itself. We argue that, although the work is a doctrine of method for metaphysics, it is already, in part, the realization of this metaphysics itself. Thus, metaphysics as the science that Kant seeks to ground in the Critique is already partially achieved through this grounding.