Entre psicologismo e naturalismo – apontamentos sobre o uso da noção de estrutura na psicologia e na psicanálise

Abstract

From the point of view of an investigation focused on the movement of the concepts and processes that turned them necessary, the use of the notion of structure, both in Psychology and in Psychoanalysis can only be understood as an effort of opposition to the impasses created by Cartesianism, impasses inevitably inherited by both disciplines. As Husserl explains, the division between the region of res extensa and res cogitans was already produced by Galileo when the revolution that reaches its climax with him mathematizes physics and, in order to do so, distinguishes a sensible world, recognizable by its qualitative characteristics, of a world of idealities, in charge of finding quantity at nature as its rational essence. Roughly speaking, modern Psychology assumes in its origin the paradoxical task – therefore impossible – of overlapping the way that the mathematized physics looks at its object to something that is the condition of that regard. This article aims to follow the reflection of this paradox in some of the projects of knowledge about subjectivity – such as Gestalt Psychology and Lacanian Psychoanalysis – that granted the notion of structure a privileged place in its conceptual Field.